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Notes and Comments
A Question of Prejudice: Rule 16
and Pre-Trial Dismissal in
State v. DiPrete
An integraland indispensablepart of the criminaljustice system is an effective pretrialproceduredesigned to protect a defendant's right to due process. The procedure engaged in is
what is commonly referred to as the discovery process, its primary purpose being to ensure that the adversary parties are
adequatelypreparedfor trial and the avoidance of surprise.
-The

Honorable Judge Dominic Cresto1

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether a trial judge can order pre-trial dismissal of a criminal indictment as a sanction for failure to comply
with discovery has received little direct treatment by the courts.
This is primarily because of a policy favoring adjudication of criminal matters on their merits. 2 It is clear, however, that there are at
least certain instances under which a trial judge can order dismis1. State v. DiPrete, Ind. P1 94-1000 A & B, 1997 WL 839899, at *5 (R.I.
Super. Mar. 11, 1997).
2. See State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1276 (R.I. 1998). The court stated

that
[w]e must bear in mind that when a grand jury returns an indictment, the
people of the State of Rhode Island are entitled to have the issues of fact

and the issues of guilt or innocence tried on their merits. The punishment
of an errant prosecutor by dismissal of the charges is in effect a punishment imposed upon the people of this state. Only in the most extraordinary of circumstances should the people of Rhode Island be deprived of
their right to a trial of these charges.
Id.; see also United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (holding that dismissal
of an indictment would "increase to an intolerable degree interference with the
public interest in having the guilty brought to book").
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sal. 3 In Rhode Island, the circumstances and conditions under
which dismissal is appropriate have not been given any detailed
treatment at all,4 until only recently.5 In May and August of 1998,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued two decisions, back-toback, that served to simultaneously clarify and confuse the state of
the law regarding pre-trial dismissal. 6 In the wake of these opinions, a former governor of Rhode Island is serving a prison sentence at the Adult Correctional Institution (ACI) in Cranston,
7
Rhode Island.
On March 11, 1997, Superior Court Judge Dominic Cresto issued a well reasoned, 38 page decision that dismissed twenty-two
counts of a criminal indictment against Edward D. DiPrete and his
son, Dennis L. DiPrete.8 That decision cast a significant shadow
over the previously settled state of the law in Rhode Island regarding pre-trial dismissal for discovery violations. The dismissal of
the charges, and their subsequent reinstatement by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, was part of the highest-profile prosecution
and conviction of a politician in Rhode Island's history. 9
It began on March 24, 1994, when a grand jury returned multiple indictments against the former governor and his son. 10 The
charges consisted of racketeering, bribery and extortion that allegedly occurred between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 1990.11
During the next three years, the parties engaged in discovery. The
State eventually turned over more than 600 boxes of evidence to
the defendants. 1 2 The State failed, however, to disclose critical ev3. See United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A district
court may dismiss an indictment on any of three grounds: 1) due process, 2) inherent supervisory powers (protecting the integrity of the judicial process), and 3)
statutory grounds.").
4. But see State v. Rawlinson, (R.I. Oct. 16, 1986) (No. 85-261-C.A.); State v.
Quintal, 479 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1984). See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
5. See State v. Musumeci, 717 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1998); DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266.
6. See id.
7. See Mike Stanton, Former Governor DiPrete Pleads Guilty To 18 Charges
of Corruption in Office: Surprise Deal Includes a Year to Serve at ACI, Prov. J.
Bull., Dec. 12, 1998, at Al.
8. See State v. DiPrete, Ind. P1 94-1000 A & B, 1997 WL 839899 (R.I. Super.
Mar. 11, 1997).
9. See Tracy Breton et al., Rhode Island on Trial: Prologue, Prov. J. Bull.,
Aug. 9, 1998, at S1, available in 1998 WL 12199718.
10. See DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *1.
11. See id.
12. See id. at *2.
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impeached the credibility of sevidence which would have severely
3
eral of its key witnesses.'
On August 26, 1996, the defendants filed a motion seeking remedial sanctions. 14 They alleged that they could no longer receive
a fair trial because the prosecution (1) failed to comply with a discovery order of the court issued pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Criminal Procedure, (2) violated a stipulation between the parties and (3) violated the principles of Brady v. Maryland 15 and its progeny.16 After an extraordinary thirty-two days of
evidentiary hearings on the matter, Judge Cresto determined that
the State had deliberately withheld potentially exculpatory evidence from the DiPretes and that the defendants had suffered substantial prejudice. Thus, he dismissed the charges. 1 7 This Note
addresses whether Judge Cresto had the power to do so.
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, two of the justices recused themselves.' 8 Chief Justice Joseph R. Weisberger,
Justices John P. Bourcier, Victoria S. Lederberg and two retired
Supreme Court Justices, Florence K Murray and Donald F. Shea,
decided the case. The court (Weisberger, Shea and Murray for the
majority) determined that neither the principles of Brady v. Maryland, Rule 16(i), nor the court's general supervisory powers permit
a trial judge to order dismissal as a remedial sanction under circumstances such as those present in DiPrete.1 9

13. See id. at *3.
14. See id.
15. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that it can be a violation of a defendant's right
to due process when the prosecution withholds potentially exculpatory evidence);
see discussion infra Section II.A.
16. See DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *6 (noting that Brady held that it can be
a violation of due process to withhold exculpatory information).
17. See id. at *21; Tracy Breton et al., Rhode Island on Trial, Ch. 14: Stroke of
a Pen, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 16, 1998, at Sl, available in 1998 WL 12200557 ("He
[Judge Cresto] had written his decision in long hand, and then asked a court secretary to type it up .... And with the stroke of a pen, Judge Cresto threw out the
case.").
18. See Tracy Breton et al., Rhode Island On Trial, Ch. 15: Teachings:
Through Turmoil and Tragedy, the State's Case Moves Ahead, Prov. J. Bull., Aug.
16, 1998, at S15, available in 1998 WL 12200558 ("Robert Flanders had briefly
Maureen McKenna
served as Governor DiPrete's part-time legal counsel ....
Goldberg had been appointed to the bench by DiPrete.").
19. State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1270-77 (R.I. 1998).
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This Note argues that the majority ruled correctly on the
16(i)20 does not permit
dismissal, in light of the text, purpose and case treatment of the
rule. Part I of this Note traces the factual and procedural background of the criminal proceedings against Rhode Island's former
governor and his son, including Judge Cresto's dismissal of the
charges as a sanction for prosecutorial misconduct and the reinstatement of the charges by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
Part II analyzes the question of whether Brady v. Maryland can
create a pre-trial remedy, with an eye toward determining whether
a Brady violation may be grounds for dismissal independent of
Rule 16. Part III examines the text, purpose and case treatment of
Rule 16(i) and concludes that dismissal is in fact within the contemplation of the rule, and within the discretion of the trial judge.
Part IV discusses State v. Musumeci, 2 1 decided just three months
after DiPrete,in which the sitting supreme court (without the retired justices and with Chief Justice Weisberger vigorously protesting) overruled DiPrete to the extent that a trial judge has "no
22
authority" to dismiss an indictment as a remedial sanction.
Musumeci held that, like the sanctions that are explicitly provided
for in Rule 16(i), dismissal is to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.23 Finally, Part IV presents a policy-based argument as an
alternative to the holdings of both Musurmeci and DiPrete- that a
trial judge should not be required to find substantial prejudice
before dismissing a case if the conduct of the State is deliberate
and if there are other factors that counsel dismissal. This Note
concludes with the ultimate irony: although the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reinstated the proper "abuse of discretion" standard in Musumeci only three months after the charges against the
DiPretes were reinstated, and although the DiPretes themselves
pled guilty to corruption charges only three weeks before their
scheduled trial date, 24 they did so without having had the benefit
of appellate review under the correct legal standard.
Brady issue, but erred in holding that Rule

20. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i) (allowing a trial judge to sanction a party
for failure to comply with discovery).
21. 717 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1998).
22. Id. at 66.
23. Id. at 65-66.
24. See W. Zachary Malinowski, DiPrete'sCorruptionTrial is Set for January
4 "The Trial is Scheduled to Begin on the Eve of Atty. Gen. Jeffrey B. Pine's Depar-
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I.

HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Governor on Trial: State v. DiPrete
On March 24, 1994, a Grand Jury returned a twenty-two count
indictment alleging racketeering, bribery and extortion by Edward
D. DiPrete and his son, Dennis L. DiPrete. 25 The former governor
was accused of taking bribes for state contracts on such high-profile bids as the renovation of the Frank Licht Judicial Complex in
Providence and the Adult Correctional Institution (ACI) complex
in Cranston. 26 DiPrete and his son allegedly extorted illicit campaign "contributions" from prospective state workers, in exchange
for lucrative state contracts.27 Dennis DiPrete served as the governor's chief campaign fundraiser, allegedly engaging in "shaking
down" potential contributors who were vying for State jobs. 28 Alleged co-conspirators included Rodney M. Brusini, Frank N. Zaino
and Michael Piccoli. 29 Mathies Santos was also named as a wit-

30
ness in support of the State's case.
On June 6, 1994, the parties stipulated that the State would
provide the defense with the grand jury testimony of potential witnesses. 31 Additionally, the stipulation required disclosure of statements and/or summaries of statements made to investigators,
regardless of whether the statements had been made by someone
who was expected to be a witness at trial. 32 The State agreed to
disclose any and all relevant documents that were not protected by
the work-product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. 33 Purture from Office," Prov. J. Bull., July 8, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL
12194457; Mike Stanton, supra note 7, at Al.
25. See State v. DiPrete, Ind. P1 94-1000 A & B, 1997 WL 839899, at *1 (R.I.
Super. Mar. 11, 1997).
26. See Tracy Breton et al., Rhode Island On Trial; Ch. 5: Big Men on Campus, Prov. J. Bull., Aug. 9, 1998, at S10, available in 1998 WL 12199725; Ch. 3:
Like Birds, at S5, available in 1998 WL 12199723.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *1.
30. See id.
31. See State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1267 (R.I. 1998). The information
sought related to those who had appeared before a grand jury after 1991, and
whose testimony related to the subject matter of the suit. See id.
32.
33.

See id.
See id.
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suant to this stipulation, the State turned over 600 boxes of mate34
rial to the defendants.
On July 12, 1995, the defendants motioned the court for an
order compelling discovery of any exculpatory evidence; on August
24, 1995 the trial judge ordered the State to disclose such evidence. 3 5 In his opinion dismissing the case, Judge Cresto later
stated that "[none of the court's decisions were appealed by the
State, thereby requiring it to comply with the provisions thereof.
In any event, the State was unquestionably obliged to honor its
obligations as agreed to in the earlier stipulation."3 6 On November
10, 1995, counsel for the State erroneously represented to the trial
court that all such evidence had already been turned over pursuant to the court's August orders. 3 7 However, on July 25, 1996, in
response to a reference that certain materials had not been turned
over because of privilege, the judge again ordered such documents
disclosed. 38 The State then offered to allow the defense to view any
materials that it had. On July 29, 1996, the State turned over
thirty more boxes of material, which included over 68,000 pages
containing exculpatory information. 3 9 The State had withheld evidence critical to the defense regarding the credibility of key State's
witnesses and had denied knowledge of this material right up until
40
the thirty-two day hearing.
The defendants removed eighty-nine exhibits from the boxes
relating to the credibility of the aforementioned witnesses, Rodney
34. See id.
35. See id. Judge Cresto ordered:
with respect to all unindicted coconspirators... a full and complete statement of all promises, rewards, and/or inducements made in order to secure their cooperation in the investigation; a full and complete statement
of the State's knowledge of any and all criminal conduct of the unindicted
coconspirators, including not only criminal convictions or pending criminal charges but also information on any known criminal conduct, whether
or not that conduct had been the subject of a criminal charge; and any
other information relating to a coconspirator's credibility as a witness
such as prior inconsistent statements, admissions of a poor memory, or
evidence of bias on the part of the witness.
State v. Diprete, Ind. P1 94-1000 A & B, 1997 WL 839899, at *2 (R.I. Super. Mar.
11, 1997).
36. DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *2.
37. See id.
38. See id. at *3.
39. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1268.
40. See id. at 1269.
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M. Brusini, Frank N. Zaino, Michael W. Piccoli and Mathies Santos, all of whom had been granted either immunity or letters of
non-prosecution from the State in return for their testimony at
trial.4 1 Judge Cresto stated:
[t1his type of material, that is, evidence relating to the State's
cooperating witnesses, is of great significance in this case because of the critical importance of those witnesses to the
State's case against the defendants. The testimony of these
cooperating witnesses and therefore, the credibility of each,
particularly the three unindicted coconspirators upon which
indictment itself was founded, is
for all practical purposes the
42
central to the State's case.
The State argued that all of the information removed from the
thirty boxes could have been discovered by the defense from the
600 boxes of material already disclosed. 4 3 Judge Cresto rejected
this argument, stating that "the defendants ... were not required
41. See id. at 1268-69.
[Dlefendants alleged that the extracted materials showed that the State
knew Brusini had committed perjury in March of 1992, that he had filed
false documents with the State Ethics Commission, that he had committed tax fraud, that he had overbilled the State for work done, and that he
had committed insurance fraud.
...that the State had withheld evidence of knowledge of tax fraud on
the part of Zaino, that attorneys for the State assisted Zaino in amending
a 1991 state tax return and were aware that Zaino had filed a false affidavit concerning his financial affairs with the Rhode Island Family Court
during divorce proceedings, and that he had maintained a secret bank account at Rhode Island Hospital Trust Bank in order to hide money from
his wife during the pendency of their divorce.
... that a representative of the Attorney General's office had sought
lenient treatment at a sentencing hearing wherein Piccoli had pleaded
guilty to defrauding the City of Cranston of an alleged sum exceeding $1
million .... that the State recommended that Piccoli receive no jail time
and make a restitution payment of only $135,000, significantly less than
the amount he had fraudulently obtained.
...defendants further claimed that the State's refraining from prosecution of Santos for bank fraud in connection with [a] loan application
constituted a promise, reward, or inducement that should have been
disclosed.
Id.
It was later revealed that the State had granted some 47 witnesses either immunity, or letters of non-prosecution. See Tracy Breton, Immunity Offered to 47 in
DiPrete Trial; The Attorney General's Office Had Said Last Year that 11 Witnesses
Were Promised Freedom from Prosecution, Prov. J. Bull., Oct. 29, 1996, at Al,
availablein 1996 WL 12471749.
42. DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *3.
43. See DiPrete,710 A.2d at 1269.
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to search out this information, even if that were possible. Rather,
the prosecutors were under an obligation to produce the requested
information that they knew was in their possession or with due
diligence should have discovered." 4 4 It had become evident that
the State had engaged in significant misconduct.
Judge Cresto determined that, at that point, the defendants
faced a dilemma.4 5 They could proceed to trial uncertain if all of
the material to which they were entitled had been disclosed, or
they could run the risk of waiving their right to a speedy trial by
pursuing sanctions against the State. 46 When the defendants selected the latter option, Judge Cresto presided over an evidentiary
hearing which lasted thirty-two days. 47 At the conclusion of the
hearing, the defendants argued that they had been substantially
prejudiced by the need to divulge their trial strategy.48 They
maintained that they would have used the undisclosed material to
49
impeach the credibility of Brusini, Santos, Zaino and Piccoli.

Judge Cresto specifically found that "the prosecutors in this case
have engaged in a willful and deliberate course of misconduct contributed to by a lack of due diligence, resulting in repeated violations of Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16, Brady principles, the stipulation
between the parties and, most egregious of all, the court's orders."50 Judge Cresto also found "the pattern of misconduct to be
so pervasive that the defendants have suffered substantive prejudice warranting a remedy beyond a mere continuance ...
Therefore, on March 11, 1997, he held that all of the circumstances
52
in the case warranted dismissal of the charges.
Although he focused primarily on Rule 16(i), Judge Cresto also
appeared to rely on Brady v. Maryland53 to authorize dismissal of
44. DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *16.
45. See id.
46. See id. They were entitled to pursue the imposition of sanctions under
Rule 16(i) of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure. See discussion infra
Section III.
47. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1269.
48. See id.

49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *19.
Id.
See id at *19-20.

53. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see supra note 15; see also infra note 88 (explaining use
of the word "appeared").
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the indictments. Judge Cresto had broader fears, however; he revealed his underlying concerns at the end of the opinion:
the prosecutorial misconduct found by the Court to exist in
this case ... has the effect of eroding confidence in the criminal justice system .... Of equal concern is that the situation
also raises the alarming specter that the system works only if
an accused has the financial resources to make independent
investigation prior to trial to ferret out misconduct to ensure
54
due process.
Thus, Judge Cresto was concerned about the systemic implications
of the prosecution's actions in the case. In dismissing the
charges,5 5 Judge Cresto set the stage for a legal debate that would
see the Rhode Island Supreme Court announce an unusual new
rule and then reverse itself on the issue just three months later.
B.

56
The Rhode Island Supreme Court Appeal: "No Authority"

When the State appealed the case to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, 57 the majority 58 held that, under the principles established in Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, Rule 16(i) of the
Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure and the court's general
supervisory powers, Judge Cresto had no authority to dismiss the
case pre-trial for the State's discovery violations. 5 9 Nevertheless,
the supreme court agreed that the prosecution failed to comply
with the court's discovery order regarding its knowledge of the
54. DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *20.
55. See, e.g., Elliot Krieger, The State vs. DiPrete Experts: Decision is 'Extreme'. Several Law ProfessorsWho Reviewed Judge Dominic Cresto's Dismissalof
the DiPrete'sCase Agreed it Was Well Within the Law, but One Suggested it Could
Be Overturned by the Supreme Court, Prov. J. Bull., Mar. 16, 1997, at B1, available
in 1997 WL 7321466.
56. This comes from State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1274 (R.I. 1998), and is a
two-word summary of the majority's opinion as to the power a trial judge has to
dismiss a criminal indictment under these circumstances.
57. See Tracy Breton, The State vs. The DiPretes:High Court Hears Appeal;
ProsecutorsAsk Supreme Court to Reinstate Charges,Prov. J. Bull., Nov. 13, 1997,
at Al, available in 1997 WL 13869012; W. Zachary Malinowski, Court Hearing
Draws a Sundry Crowd with Diverse Motives, Prov. J. Bull., Nov. 13, 1997, at A9,
available in 1997 WL 13868998.
58. Justices Shea and Murray were brought out of retirement specifically for
this case by Chief Justice Weisberger, pursuant to Section 8-3-8(c) of the Rhode
Island General Laws, after Justices Flanders and Goldberg recused themselves.
See supra note 18.
59. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1274.
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criminal activities of Brusini, Santos, Zaino and Piccoli.60 The
court also agreed with the trial court regarding the prosecution's
failure to disclose the immunity deals with, or promises of nonprosecution to, these witnesses. 6 1 The court disagreed with the
trial court, however, regarding the degree of prejudice accruing to
the defendants. 6 2 Specifically, the court stated that this was
"delayed discovery, not denied discovery," 63 and that "prior to the
conclusion of the sanction hearings, counsel for defendants had all
the information that they had requested ... "64 Additionally, the
court held that the defense had brought whatever prejudice it had
suffered upon itself by voluntarily seeking sanctions.6 5 Regardless, the court held that because it should have been clear to any
skilled counsel that the information would have been used to impeach the witnesses, divulging the trial strategy was not exces66
sively prejudicial to the DiPretes.
The court held that Rule 16(i), which provides several options
to a trial judge when sanctioning a party for failure to comply with
discovery, does not contemplate dismissal in the absence of both
67
flagrant prosecutorial misconduct and substantial prejudice.
Since dismissal is not specifically mentioned in the text of Rule 16,
and because the cases interpreting the rule do not address any criteria for dismissal, the court found that the sanction was unavailable, in the absence of these two predicates. 68 The court also found
60. See id. at 1273.
61. See id.
62. See id.

63. Id. at 1272.
64. Id. at 1273.
65. See id. at 1274.
66. See id; see also infra Section IV.A (discussing the issue of prejudice and

the alternative of eliminating the requirement that it be found prior to imposition
of dismissal).
67. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1276. In so holding, the court effectively transplanted the circumstances in which the general supervisory powers of the court

would permit for dismissal into the Rule 16 context. The court stated that "it appears in federal jurisprudence that the use of supervisory power would not permit
a court in the federal system to create exclusionary rules not otherwise constitutionally authorized or to dismiss indictments in the absence of both outrageous
conduct and demonstrable and otherwise incurable prejudice." Id. The significance of this, is that by limiting dismissal to the predicates of flagrant misconduct
and substantial prejudice, the majority has essentially invented a set of factual
requirements for statutory dismissal that is not found in the text, or case law surrounding Rule 16.
68. See id. at 1271-74.
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as a matter of law that Brady v. Maryland does not create a pretrial remedy and therefore, dismissal is not an available sanction
to remedy a Brady violation. 69
The court held that because neither Brady nor Rule 16 would
permit pre-trial dismissal under these circumstances, the standard
"abuse of discretion" analysis of a Rule 16(i) sanction was inapplicable. 70 In the absence of a requisite finding of flagrant misconduct and substantial prejudice, the court held that the trial judge's
discretion was never called into question. 7 1 Rather, the court concluded that a trial judge has "no authority" to dismiss an indict72
ment under circumstances such as were present in this case.
The court reinstated the charges against the DiPretes and re73
manded the case for trial on the merits.
Justice Bourcier vigorously dissented. He emphasized the
egregious nature of the prosecution's actions, the significant prejudice suffered by the defendants as a result of having to reveal their
trial strategy (i.e. impeachment of the immunized witnesses) and
the traditional standard for reviewing a trial judge's imposition of
sanctions (i.e. for an abuse of discretion).74 Justice Lederberg concurred and dissented. She agreed with the majority that this case
should not have been dismissed, but also agreed with the dissent
that such cases are always reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 75
C. FurtherDevelopments
On remand to the superior court, Judge Dominic Cresto recused himself.76 The trial was set for January 4, 1999, before
77
Judge Francis J. Darigan of the Rhode Island Superior Court.

However, in a startling turn of events, the former governor agreed
69. See id. at 1271.
70. See id. at 1274.
71. See id.; supra note 67.
72. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d. at 1274.
73, See id. at 1276-77.
74. See id. at 1279-96.
75. See id. at 1277-79.
76. See W. Zachary Malinowski et al., Cresto Quits DiPreteCase: "My Motives
Have Been Subtly Brought into Question by the Attorney General, Which I Perceive
as an UnwarrantedImpugning of my Integrity and Characterin Order to Divert
Attention from the Real Issues," Prov. J. Bull., Jan. 16, 1998, at Al, available in

1998 WL 6498628.
77.

See Stanton, supra note 7, at Al.
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to a plea bargain on December 11, 1998.7 As part of the agreement, DiPrete pled guilty to the bribery, racketeering and extortion charges.7 9 In exchange, the felony counts were dismissed
against his son, Dennis.8 0 Dennis received a $1,000 fine for a single misdemeanor charge and was not sentenced to any jail time. 8 '
Edward D. DiPrete, however, accepted a three year prison sentence, with one year to serve.8 2 The following pages address the
fact that the former governor and his son were never able to have
Judge Cresto's dismissal of the charges reviewed under the correct
legal standard. The proper review never occurred, despite the
3
supreme court's recognition of the appropriate standard in a case
decided just three months after State v. DiPrete.84
II.

Is DIsMIssAL

AN AVAILABLE REMEDY UNDER

BRADY V. MARYL4ND?

The majority of the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on
three arguments to support its conclusion that Judge Cresto lacked
authority to dismiss the indictments against the DiPretes. First,
the court argued that the principles of Brady v. Maryland create
only a post-trial remedy, and thus have no relevance to the issue of
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. He will serve his sentence at the Adult Correctional Institution
(ACI) minimum security unit, where he was originally to have worked at his family insurance agency as a part of the Work Release Program. See id. Subsequently, however, the Department of Corrections, acting on the advice of the
Attorney General, revoked DiPrete's ability to sell insurance. See Tom Mooney &
Tracy Breton, ACI Bars DiPrete's Work Release: The Former Governor's Felony
Convictions Mean He Cannot Sell Insurance, State and FederalProsecutorsSay,
Prov. J. Bull., Feb. 9, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 7327951. Thus, he also
lost his ability to work at his family insurance agency. See id.
Even today, the headlines still contain developments in the DiPrete saga. See
Tracy Breton, Judge Won't Delay DiPrete Hearing: The Hearing on Whether to
Suspend the Former Governor's Pension Will Proceed Next Wednesday as Scheduled, Prov. J. Bull., Feb. 10, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 7328119. The former governor is currently embroiled in a legal battle with the State Retirement
Board and the Attorney General's office, both of which are seeking to have his
pension revoked. See id. Additionally, DiPrete is said to be considering reopening
his motion to regain 1.2 million dollars in legal fees which he claims he spent in
ferreting out the prosecutorial misconduct discussed in this note. See id. He had
waived this claim as part of the plea bargain. See id.
83. See State v. Musumeci, 717 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1998).
84. 710 A.2d 1266 (R.I. 1998).
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pre-trial dismissal.8 5 Second, it found that Rule 16(i) does not contemplate discretionary pre-trial dismissal of an indictment as a
sanction for failure to comply with discovery. 86 Finally, the court
held that the general supervisory powers of the court do not encompass the power to dismiss an indictment in the absence of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct and substantial prejudice to the
defendants.8 7 However, a discussion of whether the general supervisory powers of the court would justify dismissal in this case is
beyond the scope of this Note. Accordingly, this Note now turns to
a discussion of the first two of these arguments.
A. Brady and Pre-TrialDismissal
1. "Brady Principles"
Judge Cresto appeared 8 to rely on the principles of Brady v.
Maryland to create grounds for dismissal, independent of Rule
16.89 The majority's rejection of this argument was correct and in
accord with federal court treatment of this issue - Brady creates
only a post-trial remedy. 90 However, it is important to examine
Rhode Island's unique approach to Brady, because of its relevance
to the supreme court's incorrect analysis of Rule 16.
In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held
that it could be a violation of a defendant's due process right to a
fair trial if the prosecution withholds exculpatory evidence that
materially effects questions of either the defendant's guilt, or the
punishment imposed. 9 1 In subsequent Supreme Court cases interpreting Brady, the Court refined the "materiality" standard. In
United States v. Bagley,9 2 the Court held that in order to be mate85. See State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1270-71 (RI. 1998).
86. See id. at 1271-74.
87. See id. at 1275-76.
88. 1 say "appeared" because Judge Cresto was rather ambiguous as to exactly
what grounds he was using to justify dismissal. Although he stressed the Rule 16
issue, his holding appeared to assume that Brady v. Maryland also justified dismissal as a pre-trial remedy. Accordingly, I too will examine this issue. Judge
Cresto stated that: "slince the court has found that there has been a pattern of
deliberate misconduct resulting in repeated violations of... Brady principles...
all counts of the indictment.., are dismissed." State v. DiPrete, Ind.P1 94-1000 A
& B, 1997 WL 839899, at *21 (R.I. Super. Mar. 11, 1997).
89. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
90. See infra Section II.A.2.

91. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
92.

473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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rial, evidence must have "a reasonable probability that, had [it]
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 93
In Rhode Island, however, the test has been different. In State
v. Wyche, 94 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecution deliberately failed to turn over to the defense the results of the victim's
blood tests. 9 5 Rather than adopt the United States Supreme
Court's standard, the Rhode Island Supreme Court implemented
"a variable standard of materiality based on the degree of
prosecutorial culpability."9 6 The court in Wyche stated that:
[wihen the failure to disclose is deliberate, this court will not
concern itself with the degree of harm caused to the defendant by the prosecution's misconduct; we shall simply grant
the defendant a new trial. The prosecution acts deliberately
when it makes "a considered decision to suppress.., for the
purpose of obstructing" or where it fails "to disclose evidence
whose high value to the defense could not have escaped...
97
[its] attention."
Thus, in Rhode Island, a deliberate violation of Brady results in a
new trial, regardless of a finding of prejudice.
Note the inconsistency between the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's and the United States Supreme Court's Brady tests. In
Rhode Island, a finding of prejudice is unnecessary when the prosecution's misconduct is deliberate. 98 The United States Supreme
Court, however, disregards the degree of prosecutorial misconduct
in considering a Brady violation, and always requires a showing of
prejudice. 9 In the federal courts, this accounts for the need to
wait until after trial before remedying the Brady violation; only
then can the court determine the impact of the State's nondisclosure on the defendant. It would seem, therefore, that a Brady rem93. Id. at 682.
94.

518 A.2d 907 (R.I. 1986).

95. See id. at 910.
96. Id.; see also State v. Brisson, 619 A.2d 1099, 1102 (R.I. 1993) (adopting a
standard of materiality based on the level of blameworthiness of the prosecution);
In re Ouimette, 342 A.2d 250, 255 (R.I. 1975) (same).
97. Wyche, 518 A.2d at 910 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1968)).
98. See id.
99. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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edy could be imposed before conviction in Rhode Island if the
conduct of the State is deliberate, since prejudice need not be
considered.
2. Rhode Island's Brady Analysis Only Permits for a
Post-Trial Remedy
This inconsistency is more apparent than real, however, because the remedy for a Brady violation in Rhode Island is still a
new trial, and a new trial would not be imposed unless the defendant had already been convicted. An acquittal would certainly not
warrant a new trial, no matter how deliberate the misconduct was.
Thus, Brady cannot constitute grounds for dismissal in Rhode
Island.
The DiPrete majority correctly observed that the remedy for a
Brady violation is determined post-conviction. 0 0 The notion of allowing Brady to create a pre-trial remedy would put trial judges in
the difficult position of trying to predict the impact of a due process
violation on the rights of a defendant at trial. Only in the event of
a conviction is it possible to determine what impact the non-disclosure had on the defendant, and whether such evidence in the
hands of "skilled counsel" 10 1 would have made a difference.
Until DiPrete, the propriety of using Brady as a means to impose a pre-trial remedy had not been explicitly discussed in Rhode
Island's line of Brady cases. It is, therefore, appropriate to examine how the federal courts have treated the issue, since Rhode
Island's Brady cases are ultimately derived from the United States
100. State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1271 (R.I. 1998). The court stated that:
[uinder Brady, the denial of due process is ripe for consideration only in
the event that an accused has been convicted of an offense in circumstances in which the nondisclosure of exculpatory or impeaching evidence
was deliberate or, when viewed in the context of the totality of the State's
proof in the case, would have a material effect upon the outcome or would
create a significant chance that such exculpatory or impeaching evidence
in the hands of skilled counsel would have created a reasonable doubt in
the minds of the jurors.
Id.; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (remanding for further
proceedings to determine if new trial necessary); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) (granting a new trial); State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I. 1986) (stating
that "[wihen the failure to disclose is deliberate . , . we shall simply grant the defendant a new trial") (emphasis added); In re Ouimette, 342 A.2d 250 (R.I. 1975)
(remanding to determine whether new trial was warranted).
101. DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1271.
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Supreme Court.' 0 2 The Sixth Circuit is the only court of appeals
that has addressed the issue, holding that Brady creates a posttrial, not a pre-trial, remedy.' 0 3 In United States v. Short,10 4 the
court stated that:
[A] Brady violation may... occur when the prosecution fails
to disclose exculpatory material in response to a pretrial motion. The violation may take place at that time, but Brady
may be invoked only when the trial has been completed.
While the problem exists for a prosecutor before and during a
trial, it becomes a concern of the Court after the trial has
ended. As this Court has stated, "Brady was never intended
to create pretrial remedies." 10 5
102. See State v. Brisson, 619 A.2d 1099, 1104 (R.I. 1993) (recognizing Rhode
Island's departure from United States Supreme Court's "outcome-determinative"
approach in defining "materiality" within the meaning of Brady); State v. Wyche,
518 A.2d 907, 908-11 (R.I. 1986) (holding that the prosecution's failure to disclose
results of victim's blood-alcohol level violated the defendant's Brady rights); In re
Ouimette, 342 A.2d 250, 254-55 (R.I. 1975) (adopting approach for determining
whether nondisclosure is "material" within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland that
depends on the degree of prosecutorial culpability).
103. See United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Short, 671 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1982). In Presser, the trial judge ordered pre-trial
disclosure by the prosecution of all evidence tending to negate the guilt (including
impeachment evidence) of the defendants in a criminal action in which the defendants were charged with, inter alia, violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). See Presser, 844 F.2d at 1277-78. The trial judge
threatened the prosecution that if it failed to comply with the order, it would not be
allowed to call certain witnesses as a sanction for failure to disclose the Brady
materials. See id. at 1279. In vacating the trial court's discovery order as inconsistent with Brady, the Sixth Circuit addressed the appropriateness of a pre-trial
Brady sanction:
[tihe decisions which have construed the Brady doctrine make it absolutely clear that the remedy for a Brady violation is a new trial and that
the remedy is available to a defendant only after a first trialhas ended in
a conviction and only after a defendant shows that there is a reasonable
probability that had the Brady evidence been disclosed in time for use at
trial, the first trial would not have resulted in a conviction. We find no
support in any decision construing the Brady doctrine for the presumption
that a trial judge can threaten to refuse to let a government witness testify in order to sanction noncompliance with the Brady doctrine which
comes to light before or during trial.
Id. at 1286 (emphasis added). The Pressercourt's failure to permit the trial judge
to sanction a Brady violation prior to the defendant's conviction demonstrates the
Sixth Circuit's recognition of the need to have a conviction before a remedy can be
given. Only then can one determine the impact of the nondisclosure on the
outcome.
104. 671 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1982).
105. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
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Under the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of "materiality,"i0 6 therefore, it is impossible to tell whether or not the result would have been different until there first is a result, i.e. after
trial.' 0 7 Thus, under the Supreme Court's standard, Brady can
only give rise to a post-trial remedy.
Although Rhode Island had not addressed the issue directly
until DiPrete,its cases have held that the remedy for a Brady violation resulting from deliberate nondisclosure is to grant the defendant a new trial.' 0 8 This is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's
holding that Brady cannot be used to authorize a pre-trial remedy.
Therefore, to the extent that Judge Cresto relied on Brady to justify dismissal, he was wrong.' 0 9 The fact that the Rhode Island
106. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-83 (1985) (defining "materiality" in terms of a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed,
the result would have been different).
107. See, e.g., In re Ouimette, 342 A.2d 250, 253 (R.I. 1975).
By its language, Brady mandates a new trial upon the showing of a suppression or nondisclosure of material evidence which is favorable to the
accused. This has been seen by the commentators as requiring that the
courts focus on the harm caused the defendant by his lack of evidence
which was within the State's possession.
Id. (citing Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to
the Defendant, 74 Yale L.J. 136 (1964)).
108. See, e.g., State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I. 1986).
109. In his dissent in DiPrete,Justice Bourcier apparently confused the nature
of a Brady remedy, and the type of remedy Rule 16 envisions. He argued that
permitting a trial judge to sanction Brady violations before trial would benefit judicial economy, as well as prevent further prejudice to the defendants. See State v.
DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1284 (R.I. 1998) (Bourcier, J., dissenting). Bourcier wrote:
I believe that the trial justice in this case properly referred to Brady in
determining whether the prosecution's violation of its pretrial discovery
obligations so prejudiced the defendants that any conviction following
would be inherently infected by that prejudice and predestined for reversal. Any trial thereafter would be nothing but a costly, time-consuming
judicial charade at the expense of the taxpayers and would serve only to
heap additional prejudice upon the defendants.
Id. Bourcier's argument is that in some cases, it would be futile to continue a trial
after the Brady violation, if it is clear that the violation has tainted the remainder
of the trial. If it were to be clear that the remainder of the trial had become so
tainted, the court could take some remedial action at that point, and thus avoid the
expenditure of time and resources that would inevitably result from continuing the
tainted trial through to a conclusion. What Bourcier fails to recognize, however, is
that it will seldom, if ever, be clear that the violation has infected the remainder of
the trial to the extent that a defendant has been deprived of due process as a result. Brady provides a remedy for constitutional due process violations; the impact
of which, as discussed above, can only be determined in retrospect. The nature of
Brady is not that of a prophylactic, allowing a trial judge unlimited discretion to
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Supreme Court so heavily emphasizes deliberate misconduct in the
Brady context, however, raises interesting questions about their
absolute requirement of substantial prejudice prior to dismissal in
the Rule 16 context. 110
III.

RULE 16(i) PERMITS PRE-TRIAL DISMISSAL AS A SANCTION FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH DIScovERY

Although a trial judge cannot use Brady v. Maryland to justify
dismissal, Rule 16(i) of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the court to impose sanctions before trial for failure to
comply with discovery. The DiPretemajority determined, however,
that Rule 16(i) does not contemplate discretionary pre-trial dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery. The majority
noted that the text of the criminal rule, unlike that of the civil
rule,"' does not explicitly permit pre-trial dismissal. 1" 2 Also, the
court found that the case law treatment of Rule 16(i) does not support discretionary pre-trial dismissal. 1 3 It therefore concluded
that dismissal was not intended as a discretionary Rule 16(i) remedy in criminal trials.
The court attempted to distinguish two Rhode Island cases
that uphold dismissal as a discretionary sanction. 1 14 It ultimately
rested its conclusion, however, on the idea that the failure of Rule
16 to address criteria for dismissal is equivalent to a failure to permit dismissal. 1 15 Apparently, the court did not disagree with the

trial court that the State's conduct was egregious.

16

However, the

sanction the failure to produce evidence in the name of a due process violation.
Rather, Brady permits an appellate court to determine after the fact whether or
not the nondisclosed evidence would have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.
See United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1286 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Short, 671 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1982). The impact of the nondisclosed information on
the defendant's trial can only be determined after there first is a trial. Thus, the
DiPrete's trial cannot be determined to have been a "judicial charade at the expense of the taxpayers" that Brady could have cured, until they are first convicted.
DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1284. Rule 16, on the other hand, does permit for pre-trial
remedies; including, as discussed in the following pages, dismissal.
110. See infra note 262.
111. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 37 (civil rule granting trial court authority to
sanction a party for failing to comply with discovery).
112. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1274-75 n.3 (R.I. 1998).
113. See id. at 1271-72.
114. See id. at 1273-74 & n.3; discussion infra Section III.B.1.
115. See id. at 1271-72.
116. See, e.g., DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1276. The court stated that:
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court held that in DiPrete, despite the trial court's specific findings,
the prejudice to the defendants was not substantial; 1" 7 thus, the
court concluded as a matter of law that the trial justice had no
authority to dismiss the indictments. 1 18 The court stated that:
[ilt is the opinion of this Court that the trial justice did not
have the authority to dismiss twenty-two counts of this indictment. We are not testing this order under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. We hold to the contrary that there was
an insufficient basis upon which the trial justice could enter
an order of dismissal. Therefore, his discretion in this context
was not called into action. 11 9
Accordingly, this Note examines the majority's arguments with respect to the text of the Rhode Island rule and the case law interpretation thereof. An examination of the resulting prejudice to the
20
defendants is postponed until later.'
A. Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Discovery:
Textual Considerations
1.

Rule 16(i) Discovery and Inspection

The majority correctly observed that Rule 16(i) does not explicitly authorize dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with
discovery. However, Rule 16(i) does provide a catchall phrase that
does not explicitly preclude dismissal. The text of the Rhode Island
rule provides:
(i) Failureto Comply. If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a
party has failed to comply with this rule or with an order is[dluring the course of the trial justice's thirty-two day hearing and in his
comprehensive and careful findings of fact set forth in his written decision, it is apparent that he was justifiably displeased at the State's con-

duct of its discovery obligations. Failure to communicate effectively
among the members of the Attorney General's staff, reliance upon the assumption that prior members of the prosecutorial team had conducted exhaustive searches of documents, and failure to express with full candor
the knowledge of criminal conduct on the part of significant witnesses
brought forth appropriate critical comment from the trial justice.

Id.
117. See supra note 67 (discussing the engrafting of the test for dismissal under
the general supervisory powers of the court into the Rule 16 context).
118. DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1273-74.
119. Id. at 1274.
120. See infra Section IV.A.
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sued pursuant to this rule, it may order such party to provide
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit
the party from introducing in evidence the material which or
testimony of a witness whose identity or statement were not

disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems
appropriate.121
In crafting the current Rule 16 into the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1974, Rhode Island adopted a version almost identical to
the federal rule. 12 2 The rule is fairly explicit in the authority it
gives to a trial judge. Specifically, he or she may order the production of the as-yet undisclosed discovery, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the nondisclosing party from introducing the as-yet undisclosed information. 123 The last phrase of the rule is relevant to
this inquiry. The rule states that the judge may enter "such other
order as it deems appropriate." 124 Thus, the questions that are
then presented are (1) whether "such other order" includes dismissal, (2) if so, what criteria should a judge consider prior to its imposition and (3) under what standard should a higher court review
dismissal. Because the text of the rule itself does not fully answer
these questions, this Note next considers the purposes of the rule
in an attempt to ascertain the existence and/or limitations of a
judge's discretion in this context.
2.

Purpose of the Rule

The reporter's notes to the 1974 amendments to Rule 16 state
that "[tihe purpose of the revision is to provide for the fullest, reciprocal discovery in criminal cases in the Superior Court that is
practicable as well as consistent with the Constitutional rights of
121. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i) (emphasis added).
122. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2):
Failure to comply with a request. If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has
failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit

the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order
as it deems just under the circumstances. The court may specify the time,
place and manner of making the discovery and inspection and may pre-

scribe such terms and conditions as are just.
Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 244 (R.I. 1982) (discussing the Rhode Island rule, and stating that "[tihe rule is based largely upon its
federal counterpart .. ").
123. See R.I. Super Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i).

124. Id.
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defendants." 125 Rule 16 gives the trial judge authority to sanction
a party for failing to comply with such broad discovery. 12 6 In State
v. McParlin,12 7 the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that "in
promulgating Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the
Superior Court, Rhode Island has adopted one of the most liberal
discovery mechanisms in the United States."128 Further, the court
has stated that "Rule 16 is a 'criminal discovery mechanism, [that]
attempts to ensure that both parties receive the fullest possible
presentation of the facts prior to trial."' 1 2 9 In addition, the court
has determined that "[tihe purpose of Rule 16 is to eliminate surprise and procedural prejudice." 3 0 Thus, in seeking to ascertain
the dynamics of a Rule 16(i) sanction, one must consider the functions of the rule, as interpreted by the supreme court: liberal construction l l so as to provide for maximum disclosure (within the
bounds of a defendant's constitutional rights) 132 to both sides in
order to prevent surprise and procedural prejudice. 133 The language of the rule itself entrusts the trial judge with the authority
125. Id. reporter's notes.
126. See State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 244 (R.I. 1982).
127. 422 A.2d 742 (R.I. 1980).
128. Id. at 745.
129. State v. Ricci, 472 A.2d 291, 299 (R.I. 1984) (quoting State v. Concannon,
457 A.2d 1350, 1353 (R.I. 1983)).
130. State v. Boucher, 542 A.2d 236, 241 (R.I. 1988) (citing Coelho, 454 A.2d at
245).
131. See McParlin,422 A.2d at 745.
132. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16 reporter's notes.
133. The significance of the fact that one of Rule 16's purposes is to prevent
surprise and procedural prejudice can best be seen in the distinction between the
nature of a Brady and a Rule 16 violation. Brady is concerned with the substantive
harm, see supra Section II, accruing to a defendant as a result of the prosecution's
noncompliance with discovery. As discussed above, the remedy is only imposed
post-conviction, after the harm has materialized, and the determination of the impact of the nondisclosure on the defendant can be made. Under Rhode Island's
"sliding scale" Brady analysis, the focus is on the conduct of the prosecution, and a
determination of whether or not a new trial will ensue will also be made after
conviction.
Alternatively, Rule 16 can act as a prophylactic, staving off procedural,as well
as substantive harm to a defendant. There is no need for a trial judge to wait until
after the defendant has been convicted to impose a Rule 16 remedy. Rather, he can
take action at the moment the violation is brought to his attention. Thus, as the
following pages explore, a finding of substantial prejudice should not be an absolute prerequisite in the Rule 16 context in order for the purpose of the rule to be
served. See Boucher, 542 A.2d at 241.
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to take certain measures to ensure the efficient functioning of
34
these purposes.1
3.

Civil Rule Comparison

The DiPretemajority argued that Rule 16(i)'s failure to specifically authorize dismissal denies a trial judge unfettered discretion
to order such sanction in a criminal trial. 135 The majority buttressed this argument with the fact that Rule 37 of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 6 Rule 16's corresponding civil dis134. The text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 16(d)(2), see supra
note 122, is much like the Rhode Island rule. According to the federal rule, the
judge "may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances." Fed.
R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, as in Rhode Island, we are left to the
purposes of the rule in order to determine the limits of a judge's authority in regard to dismissal.
The theory behind Rule 16(d)(2) as enacted, was to expand the volume of discovery permissible in criminal trials. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2) advisory committee's notes on 1974 amendment. In the Advisory Committee notes to the 1974
amendments to the rule, it was written that:
broad discovery contributes to the fair and efficient administration of
criminal justice by providing the defendant with enough information to
make an informed decision as to plea; by minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise at the trial; and by otherwise contributing to an accurate
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
Id. It was also stated in United States v. Maples, 60 F.3d 244, 247 (6th Cir. 1995),
that: "[tihe goal of discovery in criminal trials is to insure a fair and thorough
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence." Thus, like the Rhode Island
rule's intentions to limit "surprise and procedural prejudice," the federal rule is
also designed to allow for liberal disclosure in order to facilitate fairness in determining the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. Boucher, 542 A.2d at 241
(citing Coelho, 454 A.2d at 245). When the rule was originally passed in 1966, the
advisory committee stated that:
the . . . sentence gives wide discretion to the court in dealing with the

failure of either party to comply with a discovery order. Such discretion
will permit the Court to consider the reasons why disclosure was not
made, the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant
circumstances.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2) advisory committee's notes on 1966 amendments (discussing Rule 16(g) which was later renamed 16(d)(2) in 1975). Thus, the advisory
committee intended that the trial judge be given wide latitude to fashion an appropriate remedy for a party's failure to comply with discovery. The purpose of the
rule, as seen in the advisory committee's notes, gives some guidance, but offers
little other than that a trial judge has discretion to fashion an appropriate
sanction.

135. State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1273-74 & n.2 (R.I. 1998).
136. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 37 provides: "(b) Failure to Comply With Order.
(2) Other Consequences. If a party... refuses to obey an order to provide or permit
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covery rule, does specifically authorize dismissal. This "implication-by-omission" type argument, however, directly contravenes
the rules of statutory construction as laid down by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 13 7 In Rhode Island, court rules are given the
same force and effect as statutes.13 8 Further, the court has specifically held that when engaging in statutory construction, it is inappropriate to consider what the legislature did not enact as
13 9
indicative of what the legislature intended.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has specifically rejected the
technique of reading a statute for what has been omitted from
it.140 In 1970, the plaintiffs in Zexter v. Cerronel4 1 made such an
argument, to which the court responded that "[tihis argument is
unacceptable .... [Our primary concern... is not to inquire why
the legislature elected not to use certain phraseology, but to ascertain what it meant when it used the language .... - 142 Thus, one
cannot determine the legislative intent behind the use of specific
language by considering language that does not in fact exist in the
promulgated rule.
It has long been the rule in Rhode Island that, in the absence
of clear evidence of a contrary legislative prerogative, the ordinary
discovery .... the court may make such orders and enter such judgment in regard
to the failure or refusal as are just, and among others the following- (C) A] final
judgment dismissing the action.... " Id. (emphasis added).
137. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
138. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-2 (1956) (1997 reenactment): Rules of Practice
and Procedure. "(a) The... superior court, ... shall have the power to make rules
for regulating practice, procedure, and business therein. The rules of the superior
... court shall be subject to the approval of the supreme court. Such rules, when
effective, shall supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith." Id. "The
rules of criminal procedure of the superior court and the district court, which are to
go into effect on September 1, 1972, shall govern practice and procedure in criminal proceedings in those courts and before justices of the peace and bail commissioners and shall remain and continue in force and effect until revised, amended,
repealed, or superseded by rules adopted in accordance with the authority granted
to those courts." R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-4 (1956) (1997 reenactment); see also Letendre v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 60 A.2d 471, 474 (R.I. 1948) (holding that "[a]
rule of court, if promulgated under a proper exercise of judicial power to make
rules for practice and procedure within that court, is given the same force and
effect as a statute").
139. See Zexter v. Cerrone, 107 R.I. 92, 94-95 (1970).
140. See id.
141. 107 R.I. 92 (1970).
142. Id. (emphasis added).

510 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:487
words of a statute are given their ordinary meaning. 143 The court
stated in Blais v. Franklin4 4 that:
It has been well said that the object of all construction and
interpretation of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature, to the end that the same may be
enforced. This meaning and intention must be sought first of
all in the language of the statute itself. For it must be presumed that the means employed by the legislature to express
its will are adequate to the purpose and do express that will
14 5
correctly.
Dismissal is not among the sanctions specifically enumerated in
Rule 16(i). However, a presumption that the specific inclusion of
dismissal in the civil rules evidences a legislative intention to deny
dismissal in the criminalrules, draws attention away from the ordinary meaning of the language actually enacted. Rule 16(i) allows
14 6
a trial court to "enter such other order as it deems appropriate."
Such broad, expansive language must be analyzed in light of the
purposes of the rule and the relevant case law, not by reference to
what the rule specifically does not say.
The court has determined that the language actually used by
the legislature is presumptively sufficient to determine its meaning. 147 The plain meaning of the words found in Rule 16(i) leaves
little doubt that the rule gives great power to the trial judge to
fashion an appropriate remedy. In the absence of any textual ambiguity, therefore, it is unnecessary to travel outside of the rule
itself, its history and its case law interpretation. Thus, the DiPrete
court's comparison to the text of the civil rule is misplaced.
Additionally, any comparison between the language of the
civil and criminal rules is inappropriate in light of their differing
functions. Because a defendant's freedom is potentially at stake in
a criminal trial, the discovery available to a criminal defendant
must be examined by reference to the rules of criminal, not civil,
procedure. In United States v. Maples, 14 the Sixth Circuit stated
143. See, e.g., Lynch v. King, 391 A.2d 117, 120 (R.I. 1978); Woods v. Safeway
Sys., Inc., 232 A.2d 121, 123 (R.I. 1967); Kastal v. Hickory House, Inc., 187 A.2d
262, 264-65 (R.I. 1963); Blais v. Franklin, 31 R.I. 95, 106-09 (1910).
144. 31 R.I. 95 (1910).
145. Id. at 105.
146. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i) (emphasis added).
147. See Franklin,31 R.I. at 105-06.
148. 60 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1995).
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that "[tihe goal of discovery in criminal trials is to insure a fair and

thorough determination of [the] defendant's guilt or innocence." 149
Such a determination should not be made by reference to the civil
rules, which were not drafted with the intention of a "fair and thorough determination of [the] defendant's guilt or innocence," 150 nor
51
with respect for the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.1
Any interpretation of one by reference to the other, therefore,
draws attention away from the plain meaning of the language of
Rule 16(i).
Based on the foregoing analysis, the freedom to sanction the
failure to comply with discovery is textually committed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge. If restricted solely to considerations of the rule's text and purpose, Rule 16(i) would necessarily
include dismissal simply based on the ordinary meaning of such
expansive words. However, we have more than simply the text
and purpose of the rule to examine in order to determine whether
or not there are any bounds to a trial judge's discretion in this
context.
B. Rule 16(i): Is Dismissal an Available Sanction?:
Case Law Considerations
The DiPrete majority argued that under Rhode Island case
law, dismissal is not one of the Rule 16(i) sanctions available to a
trial judge, unless there exists flagrant misconduct and substantial
prejudice. 152 The court stated that "[i]n all the Rhode Island cases
cited by the State and by defendants save one that will be considered later, the issue presented to the Court was whether discovery
violations would warrant the reversal of a conviction and the ordering of a new trial."153 Essentially, the court argued that be-

cause the case law interpreting a trial judge's imposition of
149. Id. at 247.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., State v. Cianci, 496 A.2d 139, 146 (R.I. 1985) (holding that the
media's attempt to set aside a court order sealing discovery in the assault prosecution of Providence Mayor Vincent A. Cianci, Jr. was improper, and that the media's
appropriate remedy was a separate civil action. The court stated that "[a] defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial should not be interrupted or side-tracked
while the collateral interests of third parties are adjudicated").
152. State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1271-72 (R.I. 1998).
153. Id. at 1271 (referring to State v. Quintal, 479 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1984)); see
discussion infra Section III.B.l.a.
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sanctions does not address criteria for dismissal, it is therefore an
unavailable remedy. Analyzing the majority's argument and the
applicable case law, this section concludes that because the cases
are consistent with the broad language of the rule itself, dismissal
is indeed contemplated by the rule in certain circumstances. Further, like the sanctions explicitly provided for in Rule 16(i), dismissal is to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
1.

State v. Quintal and State v. Rawlinson:
Addressing Dismissal

The majority's "failure to address dismissal" rationale is significantly weakened by two cases: State v. Quintal154 and State v.
Rawlinson.15 5 These cases both stand for the proposition that it is
within a trial judge's statutory, Rule 16(i) authority to impose dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery. 15 6 The
majority, however, attempted to distinguish these cases from
DiPrete.157 This section analyzes these two cases and concludes
that the majority's attempt to distinguish them from DiPrete fails,
when considered in light of the clear language of Rule 16(i).
a. State v. Quintal
In State v. Quintal,the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to dismiss an
indictment because of a failure to comply with Rule 16.158 On August 3, 1981, the defendant had been indicted for third degree sexual assault. 15 9 On November 9, 1981, the defendant moved for an
order compelling more complete discovery, which the court
granted. 6 0 The court issued another order to compel discovery on
July 1, 1982, following the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure
to comply with the above mentioned discovery order.' 6 ' On November 23, when the State still had failed to satisfy its discovery
obligations, the court entered a conditional sixty day order. 162 The
154. 479 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1984).
155. (R.I. Oct. 16, 1986) (No. 85-261-C.A.).
156. See Quintal, 479 A.2d at 119; Rawlinson (No. 85-261-C.A.).
157. DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1271-74 & n.3.
158. Quintal, 479 A.2d at 119, 120.
159. See id. at 118.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
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order provided that if the State failed to comply with its discovery
obligations by January 24, 1983, the case would automatically be
dismissed with prejudice. 1 63 The State agreed to this court
order. 16
In discussing the issue of whether Rule 16(i) contemplates dismissal, the court stated:
[allthough Rule 16(i) provides specifically for various sanctions for noncompliance, a trial judge is clearly free, within
the bounds of sound discretion, to enter any order he or she
deems most appropriate. We will not disturb a trial judge's
action in this regard absent a clear165showing that the trial justice abused his or her discretion.
The court in Quintal stressed the fact that, because the State had
persistently refused to comply with the court's order, and because,
to date, the discovery had not yet been produced, none of the sanctions specifically authorized by Rule 16(i) would have been appropriate. 166 The court therefore concluded that it was proper for the
trial judge to avail himself of the catchall language of Rule 16
("such other order as it deems appropriate") 167 in dismissing the
indictment.168

The circumstances that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
found to counsel dismissal in Quintal are strikingly similar to
those found by Judge Cresto in DiPrete. Like the trial justice in
Quintal, Judge Cresto found that (1) the State did not comply with
orders to compel discovery, 16 9 (2) it was likely that all of the evi1 70
dence the court ordered disclosed had not yet been turned over
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 119 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 245 (R.I.
1982)).
166. Id.
167. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i).
168. See Quintal, 479 A.2d at 119.
169. Compare id. ("None of the sanctions specifically provided for in Rule 16(i)
could possibly have neutralized the prejudice suffered by defendant, especially in
light of the state's persistent refusal to comply with the court-ordered discovery."),
with State v. DiPrete, Ind. P1 94-1000 A & B, 1997 WL 839899, at *19 (R.I. Super.
Mar. 11, 1997) ("The Court finds that the prosecutors in this case have engaged in
a willful and deliberate course of misconduct .... ).
170. Compare Quintal, 479 A.2d at 119 ("[Slince the records requested by defense counsel were never produced, a continuance was certainly not the proper
sanction for the State's noncompliance."), with DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *20
("Given the history of the prosecutors' actions in this case and the fact that addi-
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and (3) the State's undisclosed material contained exculpatory evidence and, therefore, another sanction would not have been beneficial to the defense, or in the best interests of justice. 1 7 1 Above and
beyond the similarities in DiPrete and Quintal regarding the prosecution's actions, Judge Cresto also found that "in Quintal the discovery consisted of specifically identifiable medical records and not
the unidentifiable, amorphous mass of information present in this
case."1 72 Thus, for reasons extraordinarily similar to those
presented in DiPrete, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has found
on at least one occasion that Rule 16(i) contemplates a trial judge's
imposition of dismissal. 173 Additionally, the court has held that,
like all of the explicitly named sanctions in the rule, dismissal was
17 4
to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
The majority in DiPrete sought to distinguish Quintal on two
grounds. First, Quintal, unlike DiPrete,involved a conditional order of dismissal. 175 Second, since the State agreed to the conditional order, "State v. Quintal cannot be extended beyond the
particular facts upon which it was based."1 76 These two facts are
of questionable relevance to a judge's discretionary power. It nowhere appears in the rule, nor does Quintal stand for the proposition, that dismissal is only permitted if conditioned on the
occurrence of some event. The court in Quintal clearly asserted
tional discovery material was found and forwarded to defendants ...long after the
hearings were concluded, the court cannot rely on the State's representation that
the defendants are now in receipt of all exculpatory material .
").
171. See DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *19 ("[Warranting a remedy beyond a
mere continuance .

. . .");

Quintal, 479 A.2d at 119 ("[Ihe records sought by de-

fense counsel may well have contained exculpatory evidence, and thus the interests of justice, and the interests of defendant in particular, did not call for
exclusion of any nondisclosed records."). Exclusion of the non-disclosed evidence
would merely have increased the level of prejudice to the DiPretes in that the evidence was of an exculpatory nature. In addition, a continuance would likely have
been ineffectual since Judge Cresto was so clearly convinced that all of the evidence to which the defense was entitled had still not been turned over. Simply
continuing the matter would likely not have secured compliance, nor would it have
impressed on the prosecution the seriousness of their actions.
172. DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *20. This made it that much more difficult
for the defendants to know exactly what was being withheld.
173. See Quintal, 479 A.2d at 119.
174. See id.
175. When discussing a conditional, or self-executing order of dismissal, I mean
that automatic dismissal was conditioned on the happening of some event, namely,
failure to comply with the discovery order within a prescribed period of time.
176. State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1273 (R.I. 1998).
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that a trial judge has the power to dismiss a case under Rule
16(i).177 Even if it were obvious (and it by no means is) that dismissal were only appropriate if entered as the result of a conditional, self-executing order, the DiPrete majority's statement that
the trial judge "did not have the authority to dismiss twenty-two
counts of this indictment" 178 is still overbroad. 179
Additionally, a rule that permitted dismissal only if it were in
the form of a conditional order would result in the prosecution's
having acted with impunity in this case, because Judge Cresto did
not so condition his order. Although Judge Cresto found that the
prosecution continually flouted the court's orders, the majority
would see such conduct go unpunished because the dismissal was
not in the form of a conditional order. In DiPrete,the State should
not have gone completely unsanctioned because the trial judge was
unaware of a requirement that he first had to warn of forthcoming
dismissal.
Quintal itself does not mandate that a judge issue any such
warning. Thus, the distinction the court draws between a self-executing order of dismissal and the type of dismissal in DiPrete is a
distinction without a difference. As clearly stated in Quintal:
"[allthough Rule 16(i) provides specifically for various sanctions for
noncompliance, a trial judge is clearly free, within the bounds of
sound discretion, to enter any order he or she deems most appropriate."18 0 The only result obtained by requiring such a self-executing order of dismissal is to permit the prosecution in DiPrete to
go unpunished and to constrain the hands of judges in the future.
Equally inapposite is the court's reliance on the fact that, in
Quintal, the State agreed to the conditional order. 18 1 The validity
of a court order should not depend on whether or not the parties
177. Quintal, 479 A.2d at 119.
178. DiPrete,710 A.2d at 1274.
179. Even if a trial court were required to enter a conditional order before dismissing a case, it would be inaccurate to say that the trial court has "no authority"
to dismiss. If the supreme court is suggesting that it might have upheld Judge
Cresto's order if it had been entered as the result of a conditional order, then obviously he would have had more than the "no authority" the supreme court stated.
This is a minor point, but it is important to show the inconsistency between the
majority's "no authority" standard, and the few limited circumstances when the
majority would permit dismissal.
180. Quintal, 479 A.2d at 119 (emphasis added).
181. See DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1273.
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agreed to it in advance.' 8 2 The specter of a system in which a trial
judge could only impose a sanction after he had first received the
parties' approval would remove too much power from the judge's
hands. Such agreement might support a given judge's ability to
dismiss a case, but at best it is merely one factor.
State v. Quintal weakens the DiPretemajority's "failure to address" argument by specifically holding that Rule 16(i) does in fact
contemplate dismissal and that such dismissal is to be reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the majority's attempts to
draw factual distinctions between DiPrete and Quintal are tenuous
at best. However, even assuming that the court is correct in its
attempt to distinguish Quintal on its facts, the majority is still
faced with State v. Rawlinson, decided two years later, in which
the court upheld dismissal in the absence of a conditional, self-executing order and/or agreement by the parties.
b. State v. Rawlinson
In State v. Rawlinson, the trial judge 8 3 dismissed a criminal
information'8 4 against the defendant as a Rule 16(i) sanction for
the State's failure to comply with discovery.'1 5 The trial judge did
not specify, however, whether or not the dismissal was with prejudice. 18 6 The State immediately filed a new information, on the
182. See id. at 1294 (Bourcier, J., dissenting). "A court order, even when prepared by the parties, once entered by the court, becomes the order of the court, not
of the parties, and must be complied with and respected. 'A court order, once issued, must be obeyed, or our system of justice evolves into a system of injustice.'"
Id. (quoting State v. Brisson, 619 A.2d 1099, 1103 (R.I. 1993)).
183. Ironically, Judge Cresto was also the trial judge in Rawlinson.
184. See Black's Law Dictionary 779 (6th ed. 1990). An information is:
[an accusation exhibited against a person for some criminal offense, without an indictment. An accusation in the nature of an indictment, from
which it differs only in being presented by a competent public officer on
his oath of office, instead of a grand jury on their oath. A written accusation made by a public prosecutor, without the intervention of a grand jury.
Function of an "information" is to inform defendant of the nature of the
charge made against him and the act constituting such charge so that he
can prepare for trial and to prevent him from being tried again for the
same offense.
Id. (citations omitted).
185. State v. Rawlinson, (R.I. Super. Ct. June 15, 1983) (No. P2/83-0816)
(Cresto, J.) (stating: "[itt seems to the Court that the bedrock upon which [the] ...
search for the truth is founded are the discovery rules promulgated by the Court
and the power to enforce adherence to them even to the extent of dismissal.").
186. See State v. Rawlinson, (R.I. Oct. 16, 1986) (No. 85-261-C.A.).
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same charges, and then proceeded to appeal the dismissal of the
first information.' 8 7 The defendant moved for dismissal of the second information, a motion that was subsequently denied. 188 Upon
denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the second information,
the State withdrew its appeal of the dismissal of the first information. 18 9 The defendant was thereafter convicted on the basis of the
second information. 190
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the defendant
argued that the trial judge's dismissal of the first information precluded the state from going forward with the second information
on the same materials. 19 1 In an unpublished, per curiam opinion,
the court stated that "[it] is of the opinion that the trial justice had
ample authority to dismiss the original information with prejudice
in light of the persistent failure of the prosecution to make discovery." 192 The court then remanded the issue to the trial court to
determine whether or not the dismissal of the first information was
with prejudice. 19 3 The trial court concluded that the dismissal was
indeed with prejudice;' 9 4 accordingly, the court vacated the de195
fendant's conviction on the second information.
The DiPrete majority attempted to disregard the authority of
Rawlinson. It argued that Rawlinson should not be expanded
beyond the narrow issue it presented. The sole question
before us at that time was whether the initial information
had been dismissed with prejudice... In any event, the appropriateness of the dismissal of the first information was
never presented to us in an adversary context. Consequently
this case is a weak reed upon which to base a sweeping statement that this Court has long recognized the discretionary
authority of a trial justice to dismiss .... 196
187. See Rawlinson (No. P2/83-0816).
188. See id.
189. See Rawlinson (No. 85-261-C.A.), cited in State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266,
1292 (R.I. 1998) (Bourcier, J., dissenting).
190. See id.
191. See Supplemental Pre-Briefing Statement of the Defendant-Appellant,
Rawlinson (No. 85-261-C.A.).
192. Rawlinson (No. 85-261-C.A.).
193. See id.
194. See State v. Rawlinson, (R.I. Super Ct. Oct. 30, 1986) (No. P2/82-1628).
195. See Rawlinson (No. 85-261-C.A.), cited in State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266,
1292 (R.I. 1998) (Bourcier, J., dissenting).
196. DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1275 n.3.
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Thus, the majority's disregard of Rawlinson seems to lie in the fact
that the issue was presented, and the comments of the court made,
197
in a non-adversarial context.
The DiPrete majority, however, fails to explain exactly (1)
what difference it makes that Rawlinson was an unpublished order, or (2) the significance that the issue of authority to dismiss
was collateral to the issue of whether or not the information was
dismissed with prejudice. 198 The majority's attempt to discredit
the authority of Rawlinson is especially hollow because Rawlinson
so clearly speaks to the issue. The majority is forced into the position of declaring Rawlinson a "weak reed" 19 9 because it would
otherwise destroy the argument that failure to address dismissal is
therefore a failure to permit dismissal.
The majority's argument that the case law interpreting Rule
16(i) does not address dismissal ignores the validity of Quintal and
Rawlinson. What the majority fails to recognize is that Quintal
and Rawlinson are merely logical extensions of the language of
Rule 16 and the cases interpreting it. As discussed above, the
rule's plain language permits a trial judge to fashion an appropriate remedy for failure to comply with discovery. 20 0 If the court determines, as Judge Cresto found in DiPrete, that dismissal is the
appropriate remedy, then that finding is entitled to deference
under the abuse of discretion standard of review.
2.

The Coelho Test

The majority argued that the applicable case law does not address criteria for dismissal and then proceeded to impose the requirement that a trial judge must find flagrant misconduct and
substantial prejudice as the applicable criteria. In so doing, the
majority failed to give content to an already existing test for the
197. See id.
198. Id. at 1294 & n.20 (Bourcier, J., dissenting).
I firmly believe that the earlier pronouncement by this Court in that case,
which was said to represent the opinion of the members of this Court on a
question concerning the legal interpretation of one of the more important
rules of Superior court procedure, should not be lightly cast aside and referred to as a "weak reed" simply because it was pronounced in an unpublished order.
Id. at 1294 n.20.
199. Id. at 1275 n.3.
200. See supra Section III.A.
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imposition of sanctions that better corresponds to the text and purpose of the rule. State v. Coelho20 1 is the leading Rhode Island case
discussing the criteria a trial judge is to consider in determining
what sanction(s) to apply for a party's failure to comply with discovery. 20 2 In Coelho, the supreme court determined that it was an
abuse of the trial judge's discretion to deny a motion for a continuance when the State failed to provide certain discovery materials
to the defense until just prior to trial. 20 3 The court stated that
"[wlithout question, the trial justice is in the best position to determine whether any harm has resulted from noncompliance with discovery motions and whether the harm can be mitigated; therefore,
his ruling should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion."20 4 The Coelho court devised a four part test for a trial judge

to use in determining the appropriate sanction for a party's failure
to comply with discovery. 20 5 The court stated that "we believe that
in considering a request for a continuance based upon the failure of
a party to make a timely disclosure, . . . the trial justice should
take into account: (1) the reason for nondisclosure, (2) the extent of
prejudice to the opposing party, (3) the feasibility of rectifying that
20 6
prejudice by a continuance, and (4) any other relevant factors."
20 7
These factors also apply to sanctions other than a continuance.
Additionally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has enunciated
several other principles that apply to a trial judge's choice of sanc201. 454 A.2d 241 (R.I. 1982).
202. See infra note 207 (for cases that cite to Coelho).
203. Coelho, 454 A.2d at 246.
204. Id. at 244-45.
205. Id. at 245.
206. Id. The Federal Courts have endorsed a similar test. In United States v.
Maples, 60 F.3d 244, 247 (6th Cir. 1995), the court stated that:
Appellate decisions in this and other circuits have identified several factors which should be considered in deciding whether suppression of evidence is an appropriate remedy to be imposed for a discovery violation.
These include: (1) the reasons for the government's delay in producing the
materials, including whether it acted intentionally or in bad faith; (2) the
degree of prejudice, if any, to the defendant; and (3) whether the prejudice
to the defendant can be cured with a less severe course of action, such as
granting a continuance or a recess.

Id.
207. See, e.g., State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 319 (R.I. 1997); State v. Evans, 668
A.2d 1256, 1259-60 (R.I. 1996); State v. Squillante, 622 A.2d 474, 478 (R.I. 1993);
State v. Brisson, 619 A.2d 1099, 1102 (R.I. 1993); State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059,
1067 (R.I. 1989); State v. Payano, 528 A.2d 721, 729 (R.I. 1987).
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tions. In State v. Wyche, 20 8 the court determined that the slidingscale Brady analysis was applicable in the Rule 16 context as
well, 20 9 thereby permitting a trial judge to consider the blamewor-

thiness of the prosecution in fashioning a pre-trial remedy. 2 10 Further, in State v. Allan,2 1 1 the court held that in determining the
appropriate sanction to impose, a trial judge is to consider what is
"right and equitable under all of the circumstances and the
law."2 12 Thus, principles in addition to those that make up the

Coelho "test" are relevant to a trial judge's choice of sanctions.
In addition to following a balancing test similar to that espoused in Coelho, federal courts have established other additional
factors that serve to elucidate even further the considerations a
trial court should give the matter. These principles are generally,
if not explicitly, adhered to in Rhode Island as well. 21 3 In United

States v. Euceda-Hernandez,2 14 the Eleventh Circuit determined
that, in choosing the appropriate sanction for failure to comply
with discovery, the court must use "the least severe sanction that
will accomplish the desired result ... ."215 Additionally, the Tenth
Circuit stated in United States v. Wicker 2 16 that "[we note that
these ... factors should merely guide the district court in its consideration of sanctions; they are not intended to dictate the bounds
of the court's discretion."2 17 Thus, a trial court is not necessarily
limited to the Coelho factors, but must impose the least severe
sanction necessary in order to accomplish its goal, whether that be
deterrence of future misconduct or punishment of an errant prose208. 518 A.2d 907 (R.I. 1986).
209. Id. at 911; discussion infra Section II.
210. See Wyche, 518 A.2d at 911.
211. 433 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1981).
212. Id. at 225.
213. See, e.g., State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266 n.2 (R.I. 1998) (invoking federal
court principles to support the propositions that the least severe sanction necessary should be utilized, and that the chosen sanction must be proportional to the
misconduct); State v. Sciarra, 448 A.2d 1215, 1218-19 (R.I. 1982) (holding that "severe" sanction of exclusion not suited to State's discovery violation); State v. Silva,
374 A.2d 106, 109 (R.I. 1977) (holding it was an abuse of discretion to impose
"drastic" sanction of witness preclusion when defendant's disclosure was "at least
in substantial compliance with the letter and spirit of Rule 16").
214. 768 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 1985).
215. Id. at 1312 (quoting United States v. Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.
1982)).
216. 848 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1988).
217. Id. at 1061.

1999]

QUESTION OF PREJUDICE

cutor for deliberately failing to disclose information. 2 18 These considerations serve to provide guidance to what is otherwise
committed to the sound discretion of the court, allowing an appellate court to review a trial court's exercise of its discretion by examining the underlying reasoning process.
Thus, the "no authority" standard enunciated in DiPreteis dif-

ficult to support, in light of the primary sources of authority in this
area: (1) the text of the rule itself, (2) the purposes of the rule, (3)
Coelho and (4) the additional limiting factors discussed above,
which provide guidance to a trial court in the exercise of its discretion. These factors limit neither the availability nor the circumstances in which dismissal is appropriate. Nor do these factors
define the circumstances in which dismissal is appropriate.
Rather, they serve to guide a trial judge in the exercise of his or her

discretion.
As Justice Bourcier noted in his dissent, the case law is almost
universally in support of the proposition that a trial judge's choice
of sanctions under Rule 16(i) is to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 2 19 It was the DiPrete majority's argument, however, that
218. It is pertinent at this point to reiterate that there is an additional policy
that favors adjudication of criminal matters on their merits, suggesting that dismissal should be reserved for cases that truly warrant such a harsh sanction. See
supra note 2. Recall, however, that in light of Rule 16's purpose to prevent procedural surprise and prejudice, see supra note 133, Rule 16 sanctions (including dismissal) can serve to ensure the proceduralintegrity of a criminal trial, which may,
in a given case, outweigh the limiting principles discussed above.
219. See State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1290 (R.I. 1998) (Bourcier, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 319 (R.I. 1997); State v. Garcia, 643
A.2d 180, 186 (R.I. 1994); State v. LaChapelle, 638 A.2d 525, 530 (R.I. 1994); State
v. Squillante, 622 A.2d 474, 478 (R.I. 1993); State v. Brisson, 619 A.2d 1099, 1102
(R.I. 1993); State v. Amaral, 611 A.2d 380, 383 (R.I. 1992); State v. Sanders, 609
A.2d 963, 965 (R.I. 1992); State v. Morejon, 603 A.2d 730, 735 (R.I. 1992); State v.
O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 430 (R.I. 1990); State v. Parker, 566 A.2d 1294, 1297 (R.I.
1989); State v. Bibee, 559 A.2d 618, 621 (R.I. 1989); State v. St. Jean, 554 A.2d 206,
210 (R.I. 1989); State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 1059, 1068 (R.I. 1989); State v. Padula,
551 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1988); State v. Boucher, 542 A.2d 236, 241 (R.I. 1988);
State v. Dufault, 540 A.2d 355, 358 (R.I. 1988); State v. Brown, 528 A.2d 1098,
1102 (R.I. 1987); State v. Payano, 528 A.2d 721, 728 (R.I. 1987); State v. Robbio,
526 A.2d 509, 512 (R.I. 1987); State v. Lawrence, 492 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I. 1985);
State v. Engram, 479 A.2d 716, 718-19 (R.I. 1984); State v. Quintal, 479 A.2d 117,
119 (R.I. 1984); State v. Verlaque, 465 A.2d 207, 213 (R.I. 1983); State v. Tillinghast, 465 A.2d 191, 197 (R.I. 1983); State v. Concannon, 457 A.2d 1350, 1353 (R.I.
1983); State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 245 (R.I. 1982); State v. Sciarra, 448 A.2d
1215, 1218 (R.I. 1982); State v. Darcy, 442 A.2d 900, 902 (R.I. 1982); State v. Silva,
374 A.2d 106, 108 (R.I. 1977)).
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since the choice of sanctions does not include dismissal in the absence of a given factual predicate, i.e. flagrant misconduct and substantial prejudice, then barring a finding of those predicates,
220
dismissal cannot be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Ultimately, the majority's argument is that because "Coelho
and the cases in interpretation thereof... do not address the criteria for dismissal of an indictment," 22 1 that sanction is not within
the trial judge's arsenal of discretionary sanctions under Rule
16(i).222 The majority, however, failed to recognize that Coelho is
an extension of the expansive language of Rule 16(i), permitting
the court to "enter such other order as it deems appropriate." 2 23 A
clear picture of how the Coelho factors operate can be seen in
Judge Cresto's opinion dismissing the charges against the
2 24
DiPretes.
3.

The State FailsAll Four Prongs of the Coelho Test

Before dismissing the charges against the DiPretes, Judge
Cresto carefully considered all of the Coelho criteria. He examined: 1) the reason for nondisclosure, 2) the extent of prejudice
to the defendants, 3) the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice with
a continuance and 4) other relevant factors. 22 5 He specifically
found that the prosecution's conduct was deliberate. 226 He con2 27
cluded that there was substantive prejudice to the defendants
that warranted "a remedy beyond a mere continuance," 228 since
they were required to divulge their trial strategy at the thirty-two
day hearing. 22 9 He also found that the prejudice could not be
220. DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1274.
221. Id. at 1273.
222. See id.
223. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i).
224. See State v. DiPrete, Ind.P1 94-1000 A & B, 1997 WL 839899, at *7, 19-20
(R.I. Super. Mar. 11, 1997).
225. Compare State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 244-45 (R.I. 1998) (establishing
criteria to be considered prior to imposition of sanctions), with DiPrete, 1997 WL
839899, at *19, 20 (applying the Coelho criteria).
226. See DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *19 ("The Court finds that the prosecutors in this case have engaged in a willful and deliberate course of misconduct
227. See id. ("The court also finds the pattern of misconduct to be so pervasive
that the defendants have suffered substantive prejudice ...
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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cured with any lesser sanction than dismissal. 23 0 In addition to
considering the first three prongs of the Coelho test, Judge Cresto
also found that because the State acted so egregiously in this case,
dismissal was required in order to preserve confidence in the judi23 1
cial system.
An examination of the Coelho criteria reveals that a broad
range of sanctions are available. Implicit in the third prong of the
Coelho test - whether or not a continuance is appropriate 2 32 - is
that, if it is not, some sanction beyond a continuance must be at
least available in a given case. If a trial judge were to determine
that, given a set of facts, a continuance was insufficient to rectify
the situation, he must be free to impose some remedy other than a
continuance. The availability of some sanction beyond a continuance supports the proposition that Coelho does not foreclose a trial
judge's authority, but rather provides him with guideposts
designed to aid in exercising his discretion.
The majority's sole argument with respect to the Coelho line of
cases, however, is that, because they do not specifically address
dismissal, such sanction is only available in cases involving flagrant prosecutorial misconduct and substantial prejudice. 23 3 The
majority fails to recognize that the Coelho test leaves the trial
judge free to determine the appropriate Rule 16(i) sanction to impose in any given case. 234 Once a judge has determined that a continuance will not effectively respond to the facts, the judge is to
consider "any other relevant factors." 235 Where, as here, the judge
determines that other relevant factors exist, the language of Rule
16(i) itself2 36 permits the judge to fashion a remedy that responds
to the circumstances.
After a trial judge has considered these factors, he is free to
exercise his judgment in sanctioning the misconduct. His actions
230. See DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *19.
231. See id. at *20.
232. Coelho, 454 A.2d at 245. The third prong of the Coelho "test" requires
consideration of "(3) the feasibility of rectitring that prejudice by a continuance."
Id.
233. See State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1273, 1276 (R.I. 1998); see also supra
note 67 (discussing the engrafting of the conditions for dismissal under the general
supervisory powers of the court into the statutory, Rule 16 context).
234. Coelho, 454 A.2d at 244-45.
235. Id. at 245.
236. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i) ("such other order as it deems appropriate") (emphasis added).
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can then be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. It defies the expansive language of Rule 16 and the discretion Coelho provides to
virtually eliminate one of a trial judge's most powerful resources.
The DiPrete majority erroneously read Coelho for the proposition
that since it does not address criteria for dismissal, that sanction is
therefore unavailable. In doing so, they diminish the significance
of the text of the rule and supreme court precedent that in fact
upholds dismissal as a discretionary remedy.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized the validity
of dismissal as a statutory, discretionary sanction for failure to
comply with discovery. 23 7 It has also, in two cases, found that such
an order is not an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. 2 38 For
Judge Cresto, discretionary authority meant the sanction of dismissal. Quintal, Rawlinson and the text of Rule 16 indicate that
such action was well within his power.
Thus, despite the court's holding in DiPrete, this Note concludes that prosecutorial fault and resultant prejudice are merely
factors; the absence of one and the presence of others, might still
allow for dismissal in a given case. In an apparent attempt to
avoid reviewing Judge Cresto's factual findings under the appropriate and deferential abuse of discretion standard, the supreme
court sidestepped the question with the "no authority" standard
enunciated in DiPrete.
Perhaps Justice Bourcier's dissenting opinion, in light of the
local significance of this case, hits a little too close to home for the
DiPrete majority. Bourcier writes:
[ulnfortunately my colleagues in the majority have abandoned.., precedent, and in so doing, one is left to surmise
that perhaps adherence to precedent would not have permitted the desired end in this case, and, therefore, precedent was
sacrificed on the alter of expediency ....
The "Great Case"
now before this Court should not have persuaded the majority to abandon our well-established standard of review upon
which trial justices and litigants alike have come to rely and
depend. Rather, we should all stand firm and apply the law
evenhandedly regardless of who stands at the bar of justice
23 9
before us and of the vagaries of public sentiment.
237. See State v. Rawlinson, (R.I. Oct. 16, 1986) (No. 85-261-C.A.); State v.
Quintal, 479 A.2d 117, 119-20 (R.I. 1984).
238. See id.
239. State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1296 (R.I. 1998) (Bourcier, J., dissenting).
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Whatever the motivating factors behind the court's new rule as announced in DiPrete, the decision represented a sharp break from
precedent. However, the court would soon reexamine the issue of
Rule 16(i) dismissal and this time it would reach a different
conclusion.
IV.

AN "ABUSE OF DISCRETION":

24 0

STATE V. MUSUMECI

The DiPrete decision cast the previously settled state of the
law in Rhode Island into doubt. Three months after the DiPrete
decision, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court again reviewed a trial judge's dismissal of an indictment for prosecutorial
misconduct. In State v. Musumeci, the supreme court, this time
sitting in full and without retired justices Shea and Murray, overturned DiPreteto the extent that a trial judge has no discretionary
authority to dismiss an indictment as a remedial sanction under
Rule 16(i).241 The court in Musumeci agreed with the court in
DiPrete, however, that a judge commits reversible error if he dismisses a case in the absence of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct
24 2
and substantial prejudice.
In Musumeci, the defendant was charged with one count of unlawful delivery of marijuana 2 43 after he procured it for an under
cover police officer. 244 At trial, the defendant sought to assert the
defense of entrapment, contending that this was his first experience with drug offenses. 246 The State responded by introducing evidence from the arresting officer's log. 24 6 The log tended to show
that the defendant had previously engaged in drug related activities. 24 7 However, the defense had been unaware of the log, because it was not made available to them until they cross examined
the officer. 24 8
240. This is a three word summary of the court's "new" standard of review, as
explained in State v. Musumeci, 717 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1998).
241. Musumeci, 717 A.2d at 66.
242. Id. at 65.
243. The defendant was in violation of Section 21-28-4.01(A)(2)(a) of the Rhode
Island General Laws. See id. at 59.

244.

Id. at 58-59.

245.
246.
247,
248.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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Upon the defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial judge ordered a mistrial, concluding that dismissal was an inappropriate
remedy under the circumstances. 24 9 Ten months later, at his new
trial, the defendant again moved for dismissal, contending that the
State's failure to produce the log in a timely fashion prevented him
from interviewing witnesses "while the events were still fresh in
their minds." 2 0 Although she found that the State's nondisclosure
was unintentional, the second trial judge dismissed the action as a
sanction for the State's negligent failure to affect discovery. 25 1 The
trial court's finding that the State's nondisclosure was merely negligent, contrasts with Judge Cresto's finding in DiPrete that the
State's conduct was deliberate.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the second trial
judge abused her discretion in dismissing the indictment. After
the first trial judge had determined that a mistrial was sufficient
to cure the prejudice to the defendant and because there was no
additional prejudice accruing to the defendant in the ten months
between trials, 25 2 dismissal was inappropriate. The court concluded, however, that Rule 16(i) does permit pre-trial dismissal as
a sanction in certain circumstances. 25 3 The court "conclude[d] that
dismissal is an appropriate sanction only as a last resort and only
when less drastic sanctions would be unlikely or ill suited to
achieve compliance, to deter future violations of this kind, and to
249. See id. The trial judge stated "I think it's too severe a sanction to dismiss
it [the information]." Id. Thus, the trial judge concluded that the appropriate
sanction to rectify any prejudice to the defendant, was a mistrial. See id.
250. Id. at 60.
251. See id. The supreme court commented on the second trial judge's
rationale:
she granted Musumeci's renewed motion to dismiss the charges on the
grounds that the State's grossly negligent nondisclosure of the log had
prevented defense counsel from interviewing potential witnesses while
events were still fresh in their minds and that the dismissal sanction
would serve as a deterrent to any future such instances of negligent nondisclosure of discoverable evidence by the prosecution.
Id. Implicit in the second trial judge's findings, was a consideration of the Coelho
factors. She found (1) negligent nondisclosure, (2) prejudice, and (4) other relevant
factors (deterrence). The problem faced on appeal, however, was that the first trial
judge had already determined that a mistrial was sufficient to cure whatever prejudice existed (prong (3) of the Coelho test). Additionally, note that the merely negligent nondisclosure of the State was inconsistent with DiPrete's requirement that
the State's misconduct be flagrant.
252. See id. at 64.
253. See id. at 66.
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remedy any material prejudice to [the] defendant."25 4 The court
made clear, however, that despite the "no authority" language of
DiPrete,when the prosecution repeatedly fails to comply with court
ordered discovery, dismissal can be an appropriate Rule 16 sanction.25 5 The court additionally held that, when a trial judge imposes dismissal, it will review such action for an abuse of
25 6
discretion.
A. A Question of Prejudice
Musumeci and DiPrete raise one issue in particular, which
could have tremendous significance in clarifying the state of the
law in Rhode Island. The majority in Musumeci, agreeing with the
majority in DiPrete, held that dismissal should not be entered in
the absence of a showing of substantial prejudice. 2 5 7 The issue
then becomes, whether it would better serve our system of justice if
a judge had the power to enter dismissal regardless of the degree of
prejudice. It is important to note that in Musumeci, the court
found that the prosecution's conduct was merely negligent. 25 8 The
supreme court also found the degree of prejudice insufficient to
warrant dismissal because the evidence was eventually disclosed.
The Musumeci court found that, unlike in Quintal, the failure
to comply involved unintentional nondisclosure. 25 9 Thus, the first
DiPrete prerequisite for dismissal - flagrant misconduct - was
lacking. The court further indicated that the situation was similar
to that of DiPretein that the discovery was eventually turned over,
thus minimizing the prejudice to the defendants. 26 0 Thus, the second DiPrete prerequisite for dismissal - substantial prejudice was also lacking. The conclusion of both the DiPrete and
Musumeci courts was that dismissal is only appropriate when the
failure to disclose is flagrant and the resulting prejudice cannot be
2 61
remedied any other way.

A determination that a trial judge is not required to find substantial prejudice, however, could have important significance for
254. Id. at 63.
255. See id. at 60, 61, 66.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 65.
258. Id. at 63-64.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 61.
261.

Id. at 74 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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defendants who find themselves in positions similar to the
DiPretes. The supreme court failed to consider the benefits,
though, of eliminating the need to find substantial prejudice in the
dismissal context, if the conduct of the State is deliberate. Such a
judicial determination is only a short step away and is consistent
with the current state of Rule 16, Brady and the Coelho factors
discussed above. 26 2 Additionally, the systemic benefits that would
result from such a broad grant of judicial discretion suggest that
the supreme court ought to consider this issue. The following section argues from a public-policy standpoint that such a rule would
greatly benefit our system of justice.
1. A Policy Based Argument Against Requiring a Finding
of Prejudice
As discussed earlier, and as affirmed in Musumeci, Rule 16
does provide discretionary authority for dismissal in certain circumstances. 2 63 The text of the rule and the Coelho factors permit
262. Recall that in the Brady context, the Rhode Island Supreme Court disregards the degree of prejudice to a defendant if the conduct of the State is deliberate. See State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I. 1986) (holding that under Brady,
deliberate nondisclosure results in a new trial without regard to the degree of prejudice). This is inconsistent with DiPrete and Musumeci, which mandate a finding
of prejudice in the Rule 16 context before dismissal can be imposed. See State v.
DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1276 (R.I. 1998); Musumeci, 717 A.2d at 65. In fact, it
makes even greater sense to emphasize punishment of deliberate prosecutorial
misconduct in the Rule 16 context, than it does in the Brady context. As opposed
to the general thrust of Brady, which is to wait until after conviction before imposing a remedy (new trial), Rule 16 permits for pre-trialremedies, and is concerned
with preventing procedural prejudice. Thus, the courts should have greater freedom to punish the prosecution for deliberate misconduct by eliminating the necessity of finding prejudice in the Rule 16 context. At the very least, this would allow
for some internal consistency in the Rhode Island Supreme Court's approach to
deliberate prosecutorial misconduct.
Moreover, the court itself has recognized the applicability of the "sliding-scale"
Brady analysis to the Rule 16 context. In Wyche, the court stated that "[tihe
Court's decision today makes clear that questions involving deliberate discovery
violations under either Ouimette [sliding-scale due process analysis] or Rule 16
shall be governed by the same standards." 518 A.2d at 911. Although the supreme
court has never interpreted this language to eliminate the need for prejudice in the
Rule 16 context, it does seem to suggest that the court should tip the scales against
deliberate misconduct in a manner consistent with Brady. As this Note argues, an
elimination of the need to find substantial prejudice best serves the interests of
justice in a case like DiPrete,and in light of the heavy-handed approach the court
has taken in the Brady context, such a rule is only a short distance away. See infra
Section IV.A.1.
263. See supra Section III.
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a trial judge to make a considered decision based on the facts of a
given case. 26 4 However, requiring the judge to find substantial

prejudice unnecessarily limits a judge's freedom to consider other
factors that might weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. This is the
scenario that presented itself in DiPrete.
In DiPrete, the interest in punishing errant prosecutors on
such egregious facts might warrant dismissal despite the fact that
the supreme court was not impressed by the level of resulting prejudice to the defendants. Judge Cresto determined that nothing
short of dismissal would impress upon the State the seriousness of
its misconduct. 26 5 Since the rule textually permits the trial judge
to fashion an appropriate remedy and the case law establishes that
the judge's choice of sanctions is discretionary, the judge should be
permitted to enter dismissal even in the absence of a finding of
prejudice. If the interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial
system in a particular case is sufficiently great, the trial judge
should have the freedom to "enter such other order as it deems
2 66
appropriate."
In keeping with Musumeci, such a decision can still be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. However, limiting the freedom
of a judge by requiring a finding of prejudice is dangerous, as evidenced by DiPrete. In DiPrete, the trial judge's dismissal of the
charges was never reviewed under the appropriate and deferential
"abuse of discretion" standard, simply because the supreme court
changed the standard of review. The patent unfairness is the possibility that the former governor might have obtained a different
result if the decision had been reviewed under the appropriate
standard. The interests of justice might still have required dismissal if Judge Cresto had not been constrained to find substantial
prejudice. Under Musumeci and DiPrete,however, a trial judge is
not free to make such a determination. In effect, the court has
overruled the discretionary nature of the Coelho factors and, in
their place, requireda finding of flagrant misconduct and substantial prejudice.
Coelho itself seems to raise the assumption that other factors
may counsel dismissal, in the absence of a finding of prejudice.
The fourth prong of the Coelho test permits consideration of
264. See id.
265. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
266. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 16(i).
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whether or not there are any other relevant factors in addition to
the extent of the prejudice. 26 7 Since, under Musumeci, dismissal is
to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, perhaps one ought to
have confidence in the discretion of the trial judge that he would
not dismiss a case in the absence of prejudice unless there were
other extenuating factors. Eliminating the need to find prejudice
in the dismissal context would simply free the judge to consider (1)
protection of the integrity of the judiciary, (2) the interest in punishing errant prosecutors and (3) the systemic interest in preventing prosecutorial misconduct. Additionally, eliminating the need
to find substantial prejudice would protect the interests of justice
in a case like DiPrete.
Judge Cresto unquestionably found such other factors (diminished confidence in the legal system, deterrence, etc.). 268 Since he

found that no other remedy would alleviate the situation, 26 9 he
may nonetheless have been justified in entering dismissal if not for
the substantial prejudice requirement. The likelihood of judicial
error in this regard would be minimized in light of the appropriate
abuse of discretion standard reestablished in Musumeci.
2.

Would DiPrete Have Been Decided Differently in Light of
Musumeci?

The majority in Musumeci indicated that perhaps DiPrete
would not have been decided differently anyway. 2 70 The court suggested that the "no authority" standard articulated in DiPretewas
mere dictum; it was therefore not essential to the court's determination that Judge Cresto should not have dismissed the case in the
absence of substantial prejudice. 27 1 The court stated that:
[nlotwithstanding our disagreement with the 'no authority'
test used in DiPrete to evaluate the motion justice's dismissal
sanction in that case, we do no violence to the doctrine of
stare decisis here because our holding in this case reversing
the indictment's dismissal is consistent
with the same result
2 72
reached by the Court in DiPrete.
267. State v. Coelho, 454 A.2d 241, 245 (R.I. 1982).
268. See State v. DiPrete, Ind. P1 94-1000 A & B, 1997 WL 839899, at *20-21
(R.I. Super. Mar. 11, 1997).
269. See id. at *19.
270. Musumeci, 717 A.2d at 64.
271. See id. at 65.
272. Id. at 64.
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The court concluded "that the second trial justice in this case, like
the motion justice in DiPrete, committed reversible error when she
dismissed the indictment in the absence of the requisite showing of
substantial prejudice to the defendant ... ."273 Thus, it appears
that, according to the Musumeci majority, even if DiPrete was decided under an abuse of discretion standard, it would still have
come out the same way. One wonders if that is necessarily accurate, however, when, considering the particularly egregious facts of
DiPreteand the specific findings of the trial judge, the defendants
were deprived of having Judge Cresto's order reviewed with some
degree of deference.
In Musumeci, the court determined that even though the second trial justice appropriately took into account the deterrent effect of dismissal, it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss the case
when the prosecutorial misconduct was merely negligent. The first
justice had already determined that a mistrial was a sufficient
remedy and no additional prejudice had befallen the defendant between the mistrial and the start of the second trial.27 4 Conversely,

the facts in DiPrete counseling dismissal were much stronger. In
DiPrete, the trial judge determined (1) that the prosecution's conduct was deliberate, 2 75 (2) that substantial prejudice resulted to
the defendants,2 7 6 (3) that the prejudice could not have been cured
by "a mere continuance" 2 77 and (4) that dismissal would also serve
278
an important function in the administration of justice.
In DiPrete,there was an extraordinary thirty-two day evidentiary hearing.2 7 9 Afterwards, the trial judge was reasonably confident that all of the evidence still had not been disclosed. 28 0 Thus,
DiPretewas a much better candidate for dismissal than Musumeci,
even with the substantial prejudice requirement. However, if the
court adopted the rule that prejudice need not be found if the
State's conduct is deliberate, then the DiPretes, and others simi273. Id. at 65.
274. See id. at 64.
275. State v. DiPrete, Ind. P1 94-1000 A & B, 1997 WL 839899, at *19 (R.I.
Super. Mar. 11, 1997).

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at *20.
279.
280.

State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266, 1269 (R.I. 1998).
DiPrete, 1997 WL 839899, at *20.
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larly situated, would stand a much stronger chance of having dismissal upheld.
CONCLUSION

Both DiPrete and Musumeci demonstrated that dismissal is
inappropriate in the absence of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct
and substantial prejudice. Musumeci established that the imposition of dismissal is a viable Rule 16(i) sanction, and that it is to be
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. However, Musumeci and
DiPrete constrain a trial judge's ability to impose dismissal so severely, that it will be a rare case indeed when such action is upheld. As Judge Cresto so aptly put it, "[an integral and
indispensable part of the criminal justice system is an effective
pretrial procedure." 28 ' As DiPrete and Musumeci made clear, the
effectiveness of that procedure has been hotly disputed. It is the
final conclusion of this Note, however, that providing the trial
judge with broad discretion in this area, to see that the interests of
justice are served, is the best safeguard of all our rights.
Although Musumeci and DiPrete stated otherwise, DiPrete
might have been decided differently if Judge Cresto had been permitted to determine that factors other than prejudice counseled
dismissal. In the future, a judge might decide that the conduct of
the State was so egregious, and the systemic interest in preserving
the integrity of the judicial system so weighty, that the interests of
justice require dismissal even in the absence of a finding of substantial prejudice. A trial judge ought to be free to make such a
determination. The saga that has been State v. DiPrete has resolved some questions and raised new ones; but as for the DiPretes
themselves, the law has been clarified for the rest of us at their
expense.
Michael P. Robinson

281. Id. at *5.

